

# AMYNTAS PERDIKKA, PHILIP II AND ALEXANDER THE GREAT

## A STUDY IN CONSPIRACY

THE purpose of this article is twofold: primarily to draw attention to the evidence for a hitherto unrecognised plot against the throne of Alexander the Great; and incidentally to re-examine the evidence for the regency of Philip II on behalf of his nephew Amyntas son of Perdikkas—a subject which has important repercussions on the main theme.<sup>1</sup>

Until the end of the nineteenth century students of the reign of Philip II of Macedon, on confronting the question of Philip's regency, had simply to make a choice between the circumstantial (but at least partly incorrect)<sup>2</sup> notice of Justin—who says he was regent—and the contrary indication or implication of Diodorus and all other sources, contemporary or later, including of course Demosthenes.

On the death of Perdikkas III in battle against the Illyrians Philip 'became king of Macedonia, in the archonship of Kallimedes, the first year of Olympiad 105' (359 B.C.). So says a scholiast on Aischines iii 51.<sup>3</sup> Philip 'was king over (ἐβασίλευσεν) the Macedonians for 24 years', says Diodorus<sup>4</sup>—that is, from 359 to 336. On the other hand, Justin claims that on Perdikkas' death Philip became regent; he remained for a long time—*diu*—*non regem sed tutorem pupilli*.<sup>5</sup> His *pupillus*, his 'ward', was Amyntas,<sup>6</sup> son of the late king and nephew of Philip. As Macedonia was threatened, continues this author, with serious wars and required the leadership of more than a mere boy, Philip *compulsus a populo regnum suscepit*.

Several points may be made initially. Both Diodorus and the scholiast use the aorist of βασιλεύειν. This is normally taken to mean 'became king', not simply 'became ruler'. Diodorus in fact when recording that someone became ruler normally uses a more indefinite expression (see below). And although this practice is not without exception there are two reasons why Diodorus probably intends us to understand βασιλεύειν in its strict sense here. Firstly, the usage comes in the Proem to Book xvi, a section believed to have been copied from the contemporary Ephorus, Diodorus' main source at this point.<sup>7</sup> That is, it is likely that he knows what Philip's status was because his source certainly ought to have known. Secondly, we note that on a separate but not far distant occasion Diodorus appears to distinguish very carefully between the two meanings (though this may be an instance of Ephorus' rather than Diodorus' care). Having introduced Philip and summarised his career in the Proem, he proceeds to show how he came to the throne. He briefly (and to some extent inaccurately)<sup>8</sup> recounts his earlier life, then lists those who held the throne from Amyntas III, father of Philip, down to Philip himself. Amyntas was succeeded by Alexander, who διεδέξατο τὴν ἀρχήν. But Ptolemaios Alorites δολοφονήσας παρέλαβε τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ τούτον ὁμοίως Περδίκκας ἐπανελόμενος ἐβασίλευσεν. We see that for an

<sup>1</sup> This research began during the course of three months' work in Greece made possible by the generosity of the Myer Foundation, the Australian Humanities Research Council and Monash University. I am extremely grateful also to the Institute for Balkan Studies and to its director Mr Basil Laourdas for enabling me to attend the Institute's symposium on Ancient Macedonia, at which I was able to discuss various points with several colleagues, and to Professors Ernst Badian, Charles Edson, Christian Habicht and Malcolm McGregor for advice and encouragement. A short, earlier version of my main thesis was published in *Ancient Macedonia*,

1st International Congress, 1968 (Thessaloniki 1970) 68 ff.

<sup>2</sup> In that he states that the regency lasted 'a long time'; this will be discussed below.

<sup>3</sup> ἐπὶ ἀρχοντος Καλλιμήδους τῷ ἅ ἔτει τῆς ρῆ ὀλυμπιάδος, ἧ ἔτει Φίλιππος ἐβασίλευσε Μακεδονίαν.

<sup>4</sup> xvi 1.3.

<sup>5</sup> vii 5.9–10.

<sup>6</sup> Curtius vi 9.17, 10.24, Polyainos viii 60.

<sup>7</sup> Hammond, *CQ* xxxi (1937) 81–2, 85–9, 150.

<sup>8</sup> cf. Sherman in Loeb, vol. vii, 236 f. n. 2, and, on the length of time Philip was held hostage in Thebes, Aymard, *REA* lvi (1954) 15–36.

accession to the throne Diodorus uses either *παρέλαβε τὴν βασιλείαν* or *διεδέξατο τὴν ἀρχήν*; but when he wants to distinguish between the genuine successor and legitimate king on the one hand and the regicide and regent on the other he uses *ἐβασίλευσεν* for the former. If he (or Ephorus) is being as careful in the Proem, he is making it explicit that Philip was *king*; once having made the point (at xvi 1.3) he reverts to the more general term (xvi 2.1, 4).

Of course it is not only a case of Diodorus' and the scholiast's against Justin's word. There are other sources for Philip's career, notably Demosthenes, who of all people had good reason to note anything irregular (or which might have been *represented* as irregular) in Philip's accession. But Demosthenes, along with all other sources,<sup>9</sup> is silent. So, on the literary evidence, to accept the regency we must dismiss the terminology of Diodorus/Ephorus and the scholiast as careless and misleading and we must assume that Demosthenes and others found the regency unworthy of mention. Further, we must insist that if there was a regency then it must have been very short; for if we allow it to extend to a point anywhere near the time when Demosthenes' opposition to Philip began, we make what already calls for explanation quite incredible. That Philip was only regent when Athens declared war in 357/6<sup>10</sup> is improbable; that he was still not king when he threatened Thermopylae in 352,<sup>11</sup> or took Pagasae and Pherae in 353/2,<sup>12</sup> or Methone in 354<sup>13</sup> or even Poteidaia in 356<sup>14</sup> is even less likely. Therefore, if nothing else, we must reject Justin's admittedly vague estimate of the length of the regency. However long Philip might have waited for the regal power it was not *for a long time*.

This division of the literary sources was recognised by the nineteenth-century scholars, most of whom followed Justin, though with varying rationalisations of the *diu*.<sup>15</sup> Holm, almost alone, attempted to make use of both Justin and Diodorus, thus: '... Philip became king (359). It is true that Perdikkas' son, Amyntas, ought really to have taken over the government, but Philip was powerful and his rival still a child'.<sup>16</sup>

In 1896 Köhler published a re-edited version of part of a Boeotian inscription from Lebadeia, an inscription which survived only in two copies by Pococke in the early eighteenth and Leake in the early nineteenth centuries.<sup>17</sup> So far as I have been able to discover it has never been seen again and it is certainly not in Lebadeia now nor apparently in any Greek museum. The copies are more or less fragmentary and vary considerably in detail. Leake's, the later by more than a century, was less full, though—if we may take his own word for it<sup>18</sup>—more accurate than Pococke's. However, there was a certain amount of agreement by both copyists, neither of whom (importantly for our purposes) appears to have attempted any reconstruction of the text, and on the basis of this agreement certain facts may be agreed on.

The inscription is a record by the town of Lebadeia of certain prescriptions governing consultation of the oracle of Trophonios, followed by a list of names of people who did so over a presumably short period.<sup>19</sup> At least some of these visitors actually descended into

<sup>9</sup> *cf.*, for example, Diog. Laert. ii 56, Synkellos p. 500.

<sup>10</sup> For the date, Beloch *Griech. Gesch.* iii 1.229.

<sup>11</sup> For the date, Hammond, *JHS* lvii (1937) 57.

<sup>12</sup> For the date, Ehrhardt, *CQ* n.s. xvii (1967) 298–301.

<sup>13</sup> For the date, Hammond, *loc. cit.*, 57–8.

<sup>14</sup> For the date, Beloch iii, 1.230.

<sup>15</sup> Some (for example, Hogarth, *Philip and Alexander of Macedon* [London 1897] 42, Pickard-Cambridge, *CAH* vi 203) suggest that Philip assumed the throne immediately after his appointment as regent, while others put it later (Schäfer, *Dem. und seine Zeit* ii 16 ff., at 359/8, but Beloch iii 1.232, Glotz, *Hist. Grec.*, iii 226, Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone* 53, all date it around the foundation of Philippoi in 356). Niese,

*Gesch. des Hell.* i 27 f., Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* ii No. 61, are noncommittal.

<sup>16</sup> *Hist. of Greece*, transl. (London 1896) iii 205.

<sup>17</sup> Köhler, *Hermes* xxiv (1889) 640–3. *IG* vii 3055 shows both versions, first published in R. Pococke, *Inscriptiones Antiquae*, P. 1 c. 5 s. 5 p. 61, and W. M. Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece* ii 129, 132 and pl. vii no. 32. The two copies are usefully set out in alternating lines by Meister in H. Collitz, *Samml. der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften* i 156–9.

<sup>18</sup> Leake, *op. cit.*, 129.

<sup>19</sup> Twenty-six names or fragments of names (including repetitions) are preserved in what appears to be most of the original inscription; for a detailed treatment see my '*IG* vii 3055', forthcoming in *Hermes*.

the Cave of Trophonios (ἐν τῷ ἄντρον) for this purpose, though perhaps not all.<sup>20</sup> The key lines for our purpose are ll. 7–8, which read in the two copies as follows:

Pococke: .INT..ΓΚΗΔΙ	ΚΑΣ. ΕΔΟΝΟΝΒ— ΙΤΑ
Leake: .ΥΝΤΑ.ΓΓ	ΚΑΙ.ΚΕΔΟΝΩΝΒΑΣ ΙΛΕΥ.

This was first restored as [Ἰ]Ἀμύντα[ς Ἀριδῆ]ω Μακεδόνων βασιλεύ[ς].<sup>21</sup> That is, the king who καταβὰς ἐν τῷ ἄντρον ὑπὲρ αὐτοσαντῶ ἀνέθεικε—*Ἰκατι* was Amyntas III, father of Philip and ruler of Macedonia for nearly twenty years during the first third of the fourth century B.C.<sup>22</sup> But Köhler proposed this reconstruction: [Ἰ]Ἀμύντα[ς] Π[ερ]δ[ί]κ[α] [Μα]κεδόνων βασιλεύ[ς], a reading that certainly made better use of the letters as Pococke and Leake copied them. Whatever virtues Leake's possessed it was made more than 100 years after Pococke's and as Leake found the stone lying in the yard of a Turkish mosque (the site of the present Church of the Panagia), the degree of weathering in the interim must have been considerable; it was, as he said, 'very much damaged'. Köhler's reconstruction makes better use of Pococke's letters at the end of line 7, most of them unreadable in Leake's time; in every case the restored letter fits at least the basic shape in both copies (where, that is, both show a letter). And the restoration makes sense of the first letters of line 8, the great weakness of the earlier restoration.

Only three fourth-century Amyntases could conceivably have been called 'King of the Macedonians'. The patronymics of Amyntas II (son of Archelaos) and Amyntas III (son of Arridaios) appear to rule them out, leaving Amyntas 'IV', son of Perdikkas, as we have seen implicitly called king by Justin. Choice of this last moreover pleased Köhler because he thought the dialect peculiarities of the inscription 'für eine spätere Entstehung [than the period of Amyntas III] zu sprechen scheinen'.<sup>23</sup> Lowering the date would also mean that the young Amyntas, a mere child, as we shall see, when his father was killed, actually bore the royal title. If Amyntas was king then it must have been while Philip was regent.<sup>24</sup>

If doubt remained over Köhler's restoration it was dispelled by a consideration of one of a pair of inscriptions from the Amphiarraion at Oropos,<sup>25</sup> from roughly the same period, the middle fifty years of the fourth century. *IG* vii 4251 records a grant of proxeny by the Oropian assembly to one Ἀμύνταν Περδίκκα Μακεδόνα. Μακεδόνα happens to be inscribed over an erasure which Dittenberger suggested may have obliterated the word βασιλέα. This is most unlikely<sup>26</sup> but one thing is virtually certain: this is the same Amyntas Perdikka as we met at Lebadeia; it is straining coincidence too far to assume that two *different* people of the

<sup>20</sup> Only the first is specifically recorded as having done so, but there are so many gaps in the text that it is impossible to be certain. For details of the ritual observed in consultation of the oracle see Kroll in *PW* s. 'Trophonios' no. 4, and, most important of the ancient sources, Pausanias ix 39. Also Parke, *Oracles of Zeus* 232.

<sup>21</sup> Meister, *ap.* Collitz, *loc. cit.*; *cf.* Keil's emendation, *ibid.*, 159.

<sup>22</sup> 393/2–370/69, less two years for Argaios' reign; see my 'Amyntas III, Illyria and Olynthos' in *Makedonika* ix (1969) 1–7, Beloch iii 2.57 ff.

<sup>23</sup> *loc. cit.*, 641.

<sup>24</sup> With this apparent confirmation of Justin's notice the only remaining problem was to establish the length of the regency. Just what did Justin mean by his *diu*? And even if this were not to be taken literally, when, in any case, did Philip become king? See n. 15 above.

<sup>25</sup> *IG* vii 4251, first published by Leonardos in *AE* iii (1891) 108 no. 51. This and its twin, 4250, first published *ibid.*, no. 50, were variously dated: by Dittenberger, *SIG* i<sup>3</sup> no. 258, pre-338, by Tod ii no. 164 A and B, about 350, by Hicks and Hill, *GHI*<sup>2</sup> no. 142, around the middle of the fourth century, and in *IG* vii between 366 and 338.

<sup>26</sup> Attractive as it might be, the restoration of the royal title would leave no room at all for the ethnic, which must surely be a *sine qua non* of any proxeny-decree; see Klaffenbach, *Griech. Epig.* (Göttingen 1966) 80–3, esp. 80. The only other alternative along these lines, that the engraver erased the title and inserted the ethnic in its place before starting the word, is possible but specious. It has been argued, moreover, that the marks remaining on the stone do not support Dittenberger's conjecture; Leonardos, *AE* 1919, 64a.

same name and patronymic and from the same country should have been sufficiently noteworthy to be subjects of approximately synchronous inscriptions in the same general area. The two men are one, and Köhler's reading of the name at Lebadeia is thus inescapable.

Also from the Oropian Amphiaraiion comes *IG* vii 4250, the twin of 4251, identical in form with it,<sup>27</sup> a grant of proxeny to Ἀμύνταν Ἀντιόχου Μακεδόνα. This Amyntas can have been none other than the Macedonian noble we know from other sources, the man who after Alexander's succession in 336 was removed from his command because of personal antipathy towards the new king and who then fled to Asia Minor.<sup>28</sup> The son of Perdikkas too incurred the suspicion or jealousy of Alexander at this time and was executed.<sup>29</sup> The two men linked in a sense by their opposition to Alexander post-336 are therefore also linked by the precisely identical proxeny-decrees at Oropos.

Thus the picture emerges of two Amyntases travelling in Central Greece, their itinerary preserved in only two details through their contacts with the Boeotian towns of Lebadeia and Oropos. The natural assumption is that this belongs early in the 350s since it appears to coincide with Philip's regency, which must be dated as early as possible in his reign.

But there are difficulties. Köhler put the age of the young Amyntas at six to eight years in 359. This is reasonable. His father in 369/8, at the murder of the latter's brother Alexander (the first son of Amyntas III and Eurydike), had been (along with the third and youngest son Philip) a minor and the regency had been assumed by their mother Eurydike and stepfather (the regicide) Ptolemaios.<sup>30</sup> Perdikkas therefore is unlikely to have been born before 388 and was at most 23 years of age at his own accession in 365. Even assuming an early marriage it is impossible to make the young Amyntas any more than eight years old (and he was possibly much less) in 359. The Lebadeian inscription (*IG* vii 3055), it seems, could hardly be dated as late as 355, as we have seen, and would probably belong three or four years before that. Therefore one of these two Amyntases is a boy of perhaps thirteen years, but probably only eight or nine, or less, using the title King of the Macedonians, and he is in company with, or company including, Amyntas son of Antiochos.

Now Amyntas Antiochou is an interesting figure. We know nothing of his background but may infer from the Oropian proxeny that he was a person of some eminence. At some point after Philip's assassination, having initially served as a general under Alexander,<sup>31</sup> and having fled, as we have noticed, to Asia Minor, he was appointed forthwith to the command of a group of mercenaries in the service of Darius.<sup>32</sup> On this defection he took with him a letter to the Persian King from the Lynkestian Alexandros son of Aeropos.<sup>33</sup> This Lynkestian, along with his two brothers, had been in Aigai at the time of Philip's murder; the two latter were executed immediately for regicide but Alexandros was spared because he was the son-in-law of Antipatros and because he was quick to hail Alexander as king and to put his followers at the king's disposal as an escort to the fortress of Aigai.<sup>34</sup> At least *post hoc* and probably *propter hoc*! His letter, delivered by Amyntas Antiochou to Darius, was evidently treasonous because Darius responded by promising the Lynkestian 1000 talents plus his aid in securing the throne if he were to kill the new king Alexander. The messenger

<sup>27</sup> As well as the exact coincidence of form and for most of their length precisely the same dispensation of letters in each line, both stones bear erasures under the words ἐλεξε · ἔδοξε (line 2). Whatever may have been cut originally—and at so early a stage, still in the preamble, it is unlikely to have been historically significant—exactly the same error or alteration was made with both. Clearly they are exactly synchronous.

<sup>28</sup> Arrian i 17.9, D.S. xvii 48.2, Curtius iii 11.18, Plut. *Al.* 20. He fled, says Berve (*Das Alexanderreich* ii 28) 'vermutlich im Jahre 335'.

<sup>29</sup> Curtius vi 9.17, 10.24, Plut. *de fort. Al.* i 3 (*Mor.* 327C), Justin xii 6.14.

<sup>30</sup> Geyer, *PW* s. 'Perdikkas' no. 3; Aischines ii 28 f. for the regency of Ptolemaios (though his chronology seems completely askew; cf. Aymard, *REA* lvi [1954] 19).

<sup>31</sup> Curtius iii 11.18.

<sup>32</sup> *ibid.*, Arrian i 17.9, D.S. xvii 48.2, Plut. *Al.* 20.

<sup>33</sup> Arrian i 25.

<sup>34</sup> *ibid.*, Curtius vii 1.6–7, Justin xi 2.2.

bearing this promise however was intercepted by Parmenion and disclosed his mission. This was in winter 334/3. The Lynkestian was stripped of his command but was not yet arrested.<sup>35</sup> In 333/2 Olympias wrote to her son warning him of Alexandros Aeropou. It was then that he was arrested, pending trial (*ὡς τευξόμενος δικαστηρίου*).<sup>36</sup> But still he was not executed, the difficulty, or part of the difficulty, presumably still being his relationship with the then regent of Macedonia. For nearly three years he remained in custody until he was executed at the time of the Philotas-trial.<sup>37</sup> Thus between mid-336 (the death of Philip) and about mid-334 three significant events took place: Alexander had his cousin Amyntas Perdikka killed; Amyntas Antiochou fled to Asia Minor; the Lynkestian Alexandros initiated (or continued) treasonous dealings with Persia—through the agency of Amyntas Antiochou. At this time, that is, these three men were associated in their common opposition to Alexander, or his suspicion of it. As we have seen, two of them were also associated at Oropos somewhere near the time that the first was recorded as a visitor to the Lebadeian shrine of Trophonios; there he was titled King of the Macedonians.

The most reasonable explanation of these fragments of information, I suggest, especially in view of the events following Philip's death, is that we have here a group in opposition to the Macedonian throne trying to strengthen the royal claim of one of its members by seeking support outside Macedonia. And it is tempting to see behind the two central, recorded figures the influence (though probably not the presence) of the powerful Lynkestian royal house, traditionally opposed to the Argead dynasty at Pella and perhaps now intending to rule the country through the claimant to the throne.

And now, by a recent publication,<sup>38</sup> a fourth inscription is added to the three already discussed. It comes also from the Oropian Amphiaraiion and contains simply the words: [*Ἀρισ*]τομ[*ῆδ*]ης Με[----- [*Φ*]εραῖος Ἀμφια[*ράω*]. Aristomedes of Pherae, we know from Arrian,<sup>39</sup> deserted, like Amyntas Antiochou, to Darius after Philip's death. Now this inscription differs from *IG* vii 4250 and 4251 in that it appears on the base of what seems to have been a votive offering.<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless the degree of coincidence would be multiplied vastly beyond belief were we not to associate this offertory inscription with the proxenies granted to Amyntas Perdikka and Amyntas Antiochou. Very probably Aristomedes' offering was intended to invoke the gods' support in the venture that attracted the two Amyntases to Oropos.

The plot thickens, it seems, to include now a group of three central figures, two Macedonians and a Pheraean. At this stage the question of dating becomes pressing. I have assumed that this opposition took place early in Philip's reign—this because the only firm date suggested by any of the stones arises from the Trophonios-inscription in association with Justin's notice, on the one hand, and with *IG* vii 4251, and therefore 4250, on the other. We know of three other challenges to the Macedonian throne at this time, at least two of them backed by foreign interests: Pausanias, supported by the Thracian king Berisades,<sup>41</sup> and Argaios, by Athens.<sup>42</sup> Philip's three stepbrothers also appear to have claimed the throne; when Philip eliminated one the other two fled to Olynthos where they were granted refuge;<sup>43</sup> but it is too much to infer from this that their original backing also came from outside the country. But is it possible that there was yet another pretender, Amyntas Perdikka, aged eight years or less, and perhaps with Lynkestian backing inside Macedonia and Boeotian outside? This is possible, but there are in my view four major—indeed

<sup>35</sup> Arrian i 25.

<sup>36</sup> D.S. xvii 32.1.

<sup>37</sup> D.S. xvii 80.2, Curtius vii 1.9, Justin xii 14.1.

<sup>38</sup> B. Ch. Petrakos, *Ἐπιγραφαὶ Ὀρωποῦ* in *ADelt* xxi (1966) 45-7. I am grateful to Professor C. Habicht for pointing out to me the existence of this stone.

<sup>39</sup> ii 13.2.

<sup>40</sup> Petrakos, *loc. cit.* with fig. 1 and pl. 23.

<sup>41</sup> D.S. xvi 2.6.

<sup>42</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> Justin vii 4.5, viii 3.10.

insuperable—obstacles. One is Amyntas Perdikka's age. The second is that it would be surprising if Diodorus/Ephorus, who seems so well informed on Macedonian affairs at this time (recording an amount of detail that tails off sharply once Ephorus is no longer used),<sup>44</sup> should have overlooked the attempt (albeit unsuccessful) of the man (or rather boy) with the very strongest legal claim on the throne. Thirdly, it is difficult to explain Philip's later action in marrying his half-Illyrian daughter Kynna (or Kynane) to the man who had been guilty of treason, his nephew.<sup>45</sup> Fourthly, and this difficulty is exacerbated by the discovery of the fourth inscription, the four central figures (including the Lynkestian) in our conspiracy appear in the literary sources not before the mid-330s (with the solitary exception of Amyntas Perdikka—and he only in the Justin-notice), whereas acceptance of the early date would group three of them together nearly a quarter of a century before that. In fact the remedy is simple: we must bring down the date of the plot to the mid-330s, to the months following Philip's death, when it might again have been hoped that the immediate successor, then Alexander, could be unseated before his power was firmly established. At the beginning of Philip's reign supporting evidence is conspicuously lacking; at the beginning of Alexander's, now that we know what we are looking for, there is clear support. For this is the time when, according to Plutarch, 'all Macedonia was seething with discontent, looking to Amyntas and the sons of Aeropos',<sup>46</sup> the time when Amyntas made *impiæ insidiæ* against the throne, as Alexander later charged and Philotas confirmed.<sup>47</sup> With this date, significantly, the attempt and failure of the plot also provides us with a specific reason for the execution of Amyntas Perdikka (that is, for treason), for the defection of Amyntas Antiochou and the Pheræan Aristomedes (apparently the ones that got away) and for the treason of the Lynkestian Alexandros (who had then to look elsewhere for means of obtaining the throne or control of it). It is interesting too that our evidence of foreign interest in this group is from Boeotia, the area that of all Greek states gave Alexander most trouble in the early stages of his reign. It may even be justified to associate this plot not only with the execution, defections and treason of 336–334 but also with the revolt of Thebes and the harshness of her treatment at Alexander's hands<sup>48</sup>—because undaunted by the dissolution of the Boeotian League after Chaironeia she and her neighbours were supporting the claims of the Amyntas-faction.

It seems clear then that 336–334 is a more acceptable time for the conspiracy. We have seen that the terminal dates are mid-336 (the assassination of Philip) and some time before the end of 334, when Alexandros of Lynkos was cashiered, an event which may have followed at some distance after the fruition and failure of the plot, because he was involved, if at all, only indirectly, or he would not have survived in office until then. It seems obvious that news of the plot must have reached Macedonia very shortly after the canvassing of Boeotian support;<sup>49</sup> such a public campaign must have been a do-or-die effort. Also, for

<sup>44</sup> Hammond *CQ* xxxi (1937) esp. 85–9.

<sup>45</sup> Athenaeus xiii 557B, 560F.

<sup>46</sup> Plut. *de fort. Al.* i 3.

<sup>47</sup> Curtius vi 9.17, 10.24 f.

<sup>48</sup> Arrian i 7–8.

<sup>49</sup> The Oropian proxeny-grants (which may have numbered originally more than the two preserved) presumably represent at least moral support for the pretender. Dr J. J. Coulton (*BSA* lxiii [1968] 147 ff., esp. 181) has conjectured on the basis of 'by no means conclusive' stylistic evidence that the proxenies may have been conferred in recognition of a private benefaction—the donation of the stoa in the Oropian Amphiraion—but he has kindly informed me that a lowering of the date of these inscriptions to 335 would almost certainly exclude their connection with

the stoa, which he would prefer to date higher, rather than lower, than 360. The same motivation, moral support, may be supposed to have inspired the use of the royal title in the Lebadeian inscription. As I have proposed elsewhere (see n. 19), the Lebadeians erred badly in their judgement of the situation, it seems; they may well indeed have been among those in mid-335 who thought Alexander dead (see n. 52) and they may additionally have played safe by their peculiar and enigmatic use of *ὑπὲρ αὐτοσσωτῶ* (line 9) in the reference to Amyntas' consultation of the oracle. Since their action was in technical violation of the charter of the League of Corinth (*IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 236 ll. 11 ff.), we presumably owe the survival of the stone undefaced to the relative obscurity of the oracle and its home.

such an open attempt to have been made, it must have been executed at a time when it seemed retribution would be too long delayed to be effective. In Spring 335<sup>50</sup> Alexander began his campaigns to the north of Macedonia, campaigns that ended in the Autumn of that year with the forced march to Thebes.<sup>51</sup> The king at one stage, in the middle of the year, actually reached and crossed the Danube. Such an opportunity was ideal for an attempt to unseat him, especially if he was to be eradicated before he could consolidate his position by victories in Persia. In mid-335 he was far away; then, by September, he was rumoured to be dead in battle.<sup>52</sup> So the most probable date, I believe, is Summer or Autumn 335. We may assume in that case that the terrible fate suffered by the Thebans in October put paid to all hopes of Boeotian support. Perhaps Amyntas Perdikka was captured and executed (not, as we now see, because Alexander was simply insecure but on a genuine charge of treason),<sup>53</sup> and his execution fell, as Justin's order of presentation implies,<sup>54</sup> between the fall of Thebes in October 335 and the beginning of the Persian expedition in Spring 334. The conspiracy, when 'all Macedonia was seething with discontent and looking to Amyntas and the sons of Aeropos' (technically, by this time, the son and grandsons) was probably in mid-335, and *IG* vii 3055, 4250 and 4251 as well as the new Aristomedes-inscription should be dated here.

One consequence of this dating returns us to the original problem: *IG* vii 3055, the Trophonios-inscription from Lebadeia, is removed 25 years from the date at which it supplements Justin's claim that Philip began his reign as regent for his nephew. Amyntas Perdikka was addressed as king, but this was in 335 and not 359; and this was not when he *was* king but when he wanted to become king. Justin's claim therefore stands alone—for what it is worth!

As we have already noticed, it is at least partly wrong; if Philip was regent at all he was not so *for a long time*. But may we discount the basic claim? General remarks may be made, of course, on Justin's quality as an epitomator: it would be difficult to imagine a more defective 'conduit'<sup>55</sup> for Pompeius Trogus—whose own relationship to his own sources is anybody's guess. Justin is riddled with errors and a clash of sources will tend to be resolved to his discredit. But this may be one of his trustworthy occasions.

But would we not imagine that a developed monarchy had some accepted procedure to operate in case of a ruler's untimely death? We know that Amyntas had the most direct claim, as son of the late king, and we know that he was far too young to rule.<sup>56</sup> Should we not therefore positively *expect* some such indication as Justin gives? The answer, naturally, is affirmative, but this makes the silence of Diodorus/Ephorus, etc., all the more puzzling. Jumping forward a century, we meet the case of Antigonos Doson's regency for Philip V. How similar it all appears: the heir presumptive is too young (just under nine years); the relative is appointed regent, promising (in Doson's case) to the dying king to safeguard the interests of his ward; troubles press in on the kingdom and the regent becomes king (at his own request).<sup>57</sup> This appears a close parallel, but, if so, it is surprising that neither Doson nor Polybius underlines it for us, although it would clearly have strengthened the former's plea. He could have appealed to the obvious (obvious, that is, if Justin is correct) and overwhelmingly favourable precedent; after all, the last time the Macedonians made a regent king he won them an empire!

<sup>50</sup> Arrian i 1.4.

<sup>51</sup> Arrian i 7 ff.

<sup>52</sup> Arrian i 7.6.

<sup>53</sup> We note from Curtius vi 9.17, 10.24 f. that the genuineness of the Amyntas-plot is unquestioned; the only point under dispute is Philotas' part in it.

<sup>54</sup> Justin xi 5.1.

<sup>55</sup> The term is Edson's; see *CPh* lvi (1961) 198–203.

<sup>56</sup> There is no inherent difficulty in supposing that

the *Heeresversammlung* could bypass Amyntas Perdikka for Philip in 359—at least, it should not be difficult for those (to my knowledge, everyone nowadays) who can accept the notion that it acted to replace *the already acclaimed successor* by his uncle at some later date.

<sup>57</sup> For refs. see Walbank, *Philip V of Macedon* 3–4, 295–9.

Further, on the assumption that Macedonia had some accepted practice for filling a regal hiatus, there is, however, a great difference in practical terms between, say, a sixteen-year-old and a one-year-old heir. Philip V was nearly nine years old when he became king in name, but two years later his regent Doso was able to bluff his way on to the throne.<sup>58</sup> Amyntas Perdikka in 359 was at most about the same age as Philip V when *his* father died, but let us not overlook the possibility that the former was not eight years but only half that or even only eight months old, and he, unlike Philip V, did not have an aging father with adequate time and foreknowledge to arrange for his guardianship and eventual succession; Perdikkas was killed in battle at an early age (under 30) and at the height of his success and most probably had not gone to the same lengths an old man would consider necessary to ensure his son's accession. In the first place, then, if there was a procedure for such circumstances, it probably did not necessarily operate whatever the age of the heir. There is a practical limit to the time a throne might be kept warm for an intended successor and the Macedonians may have recognised this constitutionally or in practice. And, in the second place, if this procedure was not automatic then the heir's succession would have depended not only on the *auctoritas* of the dying king and the interests of his followers and successors but also on his preparedness for death.

Clearly all this is speculative. The point simply, I suggest, is that we are not *compelled* to assume the intervention of a regency after Perdikkas' death either because it is to be expected or because Justin says it was there. Opposed to Justin there is the compelling but inconclusive evidence of Diodorus/Ephorus and the Aischines-scholiast plus the silence of, among others, Demosthenes. But there is more than this. Amyntas is mentioned some half a dozen times in the literary sources for the end of Philip's reign and the beginning of Alexander's.<sup>59</sup> Yet who would ever know, either from these references or from the silence of Arrian and Diodorus, that the man involved in the *insidiae* against Alexander, the man playing a posthumous role in the trial of Philotas, was none other than the *ex-King of the Macedonians*? The one dubious (though circumstantial) notice of Justin has to be balanced not only against the contrary implications or silence of the sources for Philip's reign but also against the silence of the Alexander-sources. In my view, therefore, we are justified in rejecting Justin. Philip II was never regent of Macedonia.

However, to return to the main theme: we have so far taken little account of the second part of Plutarch's sentence: it was not only to Amyntas that Macedonia looked but also to the sons of Aeropos. Of his three sons two were already dead by the end of 336,<sup>60</sup> but the third and two grandsons still lived. Neoptolemos was yet another τῶν παρὰ Δαρείου αὐτομολησάντων;<sup>61</sup> perhaps he panicked on the execution of his father Arrabaios. But Amyntas Arrabaiou, apparently more coolheaded than his brother (and in any case he had been in Asia Minor with the advance-party when Philip was murdered),<sup>62</sup> held a command over the Macedonian *prodromoi* and one squadron of Companions at Granikos.<sup>63</sup> At Sagalassos (in Winter 334/3) he commanded the whole of the left wing.<sup>64</sup> Thereafter, in spite of his high offices to this point, he is never again mentioned by any source. As Berve did not fail to notice,<sup>65</sup> Amyntas' apparent disappearance comes at the same time as the loss by his uncle Alexandros of his own command over the Thessalian cavalry. If 'the sons of Aeropos' were central to the unrest following Alexander's accession, these were the three men in question. If they were involved in the Amyntas-plot then its failure probably provided the motive for Neoptolemos' flight to the east; Amyntas Arrabaiou, as we have

<sup>58</sup> The date is disputed; see *ibid.*, 295 f.

<sup>59</sup> Arrian *succ.* 22, Polyainos viii 60, Plut. *de fort.* Al. i 3, Curtius vi 9.17, 10.24, Justin xii 6.14.

<sup>60</sup> See n. 34.

<sup>61</sup> Arr. i 20.10.

<sup>62</sup> Justin ix 5.8.

<sup>63</sup> Arr. i 12.7, 14.1, 6, 15.1. He had probably also commanded the *prodromoi* on the advance-party; Brunt, *JHS* lxxxiii (1963) 27.

<sup>64</sup> Arr. i 28.4.

<sup>65</sup> *Das Alexanderreich* ii no. 59.

noticed, was in Asia Minor, while Alexandros was *στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ Θράκης*,<sup>66</sup> an appointment made shortly after Philip's death and not altered until the great expedition began.

Whatever Alexander's motive for executing the two Lynkestians for regicide (and, as Badian<sup>67</sup> notes, their unpreparedness suggests their innocence), it is clear that he selected them as scapegoats because this was plausible. The history of the schism between the central Macedonian monarchy and the princedoms of Upper Macedonia, especially Lynkos, is too large to explore here.<sup>68</sup> But it seems likely that Alexander seized on the Lynkestians because everyone knew their dislike of the Argead kings—and in particular of the king who more than anyone else had forced them to give allegiance to the monarchy.<sup>69</sup> Now if it was the Lynkestian royal house, as Plutarch says,<sup>70</sup> that was centrally involved in the deep unrest of 336–335, it seems very likely that we have here a recurrence of Macedonia's old problem of disunity; whether the dissension affected *πᾶσα Μακεδονία*<sup>71</sup> or not, it is probable that the central trouble-spot was Upper Macedonia. Alexander's troop-dispositions for the Asian expedition seem to bear this out. It appears that the infantry-levy on Upper Macedonia was disproportionately high.<sup>72</sup> Coupled with this is the fact that the Upper Macedonian Cavalry squadron was left behind<sup>73</sup> while the three infantry *taxeis* were taken with Alexander<sup>74</sup>—perhaps with the intention of dividing the forces from the disaffected area.

That the unrest was primarily in this area would also then explain why the king had to act so circumspectly towards the two high-ranking Lynkestians in his army. By Spring 334, of the five known members of Lynkestian royalty alive in mid-336, two had been executed for regicide and one had fled to join the Persian King and possibly some suspicion attached to the two remaining members as a result of the Amyntas-conspiracy. In Winter 334 Alexandros was demoted though not tried for treason; yet his connection with Antipatros

<sup>66</sup> Arrian i 25.2.

<sup>67</sup> *Phoenix* xvii (1963) 244–50, esp. 248.

<sup>68</sup> See, for a brief treatment, Wilcken, *Alexander the Great* (Norton 1967) chap. 2. I have treated the subject in some detail elsewhere (*The Unification of Macedonia under Philip II*, diss. [Monash University 1970]).

<sup>69</sup> Wilcken, *op. cit.*, 24.

<sup>70</sup> *de fort. Al.* i 3.

<sup>71</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>72</sup> The total area of Macedonia as Philip left it was in the region of 16,000 square miles (compared with less than 11,000 in 359); I find Beloch's calculation (iii 1.294, 312 f.) a little low but since he gives no map I am unable to check his location of the borders. Of the area at 336 about 5,500 (or one third) represent Upper Macedonia and 1,550 the Chalkidian peninsula, the latter, as Beloch notes, being the most densely populated area in the now expanded Macedonian state. It emerges from a consideration of the figures for Alexander's forces in 334 (detailed in D.S. xvii 17) and from indications in the Alexander-sources that six *taxeis* of territorially levied *pezetairoi* were taken with the expeditionary force (Berve i 112 ff., Tarn, *Alexander the Great* ii 153 ff.), while 12,000 of these troops were left with Antipatros—making another six to eight *taxeis*. Of the twelve to fourteen total, three were from Upper Macedonia (D.S. xvii 57.2; these were all taken by the king), giving this area one quarter, or a little under, of the total levy. In central and eastern Macedonia most

of the inhabitants were undoubtedly concentrated on the plains where most of the settlements were located (Casson, *Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria* 79–86, 88–90). Upper Macedonia had very few cities and the area of its plains was small. Its economy, to judge by the terrain, must have been largely pastoral rather than agricultural. Therefore it seems incredible that its population-density can have been anywhere near 75 per cent of that for central and eastern Macedonia, which suggests strongly that its levy was heavier than the national average. Further, there appears to have been only one *ile* of Companion Cavalry for the whole of Upper Macedonia (Arrian i 2.5, Berve i 105), out of a total of at least six territorially recruited (Arrian i 2.5 with iii 11.8, i 12.7, 14.1–6, 15.13, ii 9.3); since the identifiable areas represented are only a relatively small part of the whole state, it seems likely that the 1500 cavalry left with Antipatros represent another six to eight squadrons (Tarn *Alexander* ii 156, Brunt, *JHS* lxxxiii [1963] 35, Milns, *JHS* lxxxvi [1966] 167 concur in putting the complement per squadron at about 200, with perhaps 300 in the Royal Squadron, which was not territorially levied). There may have been political reasons for the low Upper Macedonian representation in the élite cavalry, but the apparent discrepancy between its proportion of the cavalry and the infantry forces again suggests a heavy infantry-levy.

<sup>73</sup> Berve i 105.

<sup>74</sup> D.S. xvii 57.2; cf. Arrian i 2.5.

could hardly have protected him after the crossing to Asia Minor,<sup>75</sup> because whatever influence Alexander's regent was able to exercise over the king it was at the very most his ability to reveal that Alexander had been behind Philip's assassination<sup>76</sup>—and by accepting the appointment to the regency he had made himself at least accessory after that fact. The simplest way to explain Alexander's failure to eradicate Alexandros for four years after his demotion is that he feared to exacerbate dissension that already existed in Upper Macedonia and in the three brigades from that area in the expeditionary force.

Finally, it remains to suggest a reconstruction of the relevant events around and following Philip's death. I accept Badian's arguments that the execution of the two Lynkestians was designed to draw suspicion (whether justified or not) away from Alexander, Olympias and Antipatros. But it seems unlikely that this action would have been taken if Upper Macedonia had already been near revolt. Therefore the most probable explanation, I believe, is as follows. By 336 it was obvious to Olympias and Alexander that they stood to lose everything if Philip were to live long enough to produce another heir to the throne.<sup>77</sup> Therefore, with the help of Antipatros they engineered his murder. But having done this they were faced, as they must have expected, with the suspicion of at least many of those connected with the court who knew the circumstances of the tension that had developed between Philip and his son.<sup>78</sup> So they had their scapegoats ready: two of the princes of Lynkos, members of a family and a region traditionally opposed and well known to be opposed to Philip. Given this, the charge seemed plausible enough to carry weight, even though we are left, as Badian<sup>79</sup> points out, with the peculiar situation in which 'the two brothers who were supposed to have procured Philip's assassination were taken entirely by surprise . . . while the third brother was obviously well prepared for what happened and took immediate action on it . . . and the man concerned was Antipatros' son-in-law'. But whether the ploy was sufficiently convincing or not, unrest, starting in Lynkos and Upper Macedonia, spread widely—and the conspiracy of mid-335, which we have examined, sprang out of it. But although the conspiracy was crushed, the partisan feeling that inspired it remained, and Alexander's subsequent division of the Upper Macedonian forces and his careful treatment of the remaining son (and grandson?) of Aeropos show that he realised the seriousness of what he had done. It is a tribute to his skill in handling the problem, as well as to his success as a general and propagandist, that by 330 he felt sufficiently confident of his power to eradicate Alexandros (and perhaps the latter's nephew Amyntas; a key year this, in which the king also moved finally against the family of Parmenion!).<sup>80</sup> But it is perhaps more to Philip's credit that as a result of the policies he had implemented to unify the country even the foolish initial action taken by his son in his choice of scapegoats was not sufficient to divide the country irremediably into two.

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<sup>75</sup> Badian, *op. cit.* (n.67), 248, suggests that Alexander had to delay action until he was well away from Macedonia.

<sup>76</sup> It is not clear that Alexander was guilty of patricide (through the agency of the assassin Pausanias; D.S. xvi 92), but as Badian shows (*op. cit.*) he must stand at the head of any list of suspects on grounds of motive and opportunity.

<sup>77</sup> Attalos' tactless but revealing remark at the celebration of Philip's marriage to the well born Kleopatra (Plut. *Al.* 9.5: . . . παρεκάλει τούς Μακεδόνας αἰτεῖσθαι παρὰ θεῶν γνήσιον ἐκ Φιλίππου

καὶ Κλεοπάτρας γενέσθαι διάδοχον τῆς βασιλείας) makes this clear. Although Plutarch claims that Attalos was drunk, it should be stressed that for Attalos to have made this invocation he must have been very confident that Philip had no intention of leaving the kingdom to his hitherto intended heir.

<sup>78</sup> Badian (*loc. cit.*) details the known stages of their growing estrangement.

<sup>79</sup> *loc. cit.*, 248.

<sup>80</sup> On the significance for Alexander's personal power see Milns, *Alexander the Great* (Robert Hale 1968) 143 f., 159 ff.